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Abstract
The paper is devoted to the first-order mean field game system in the case
when the distribution of players can contain atoms. The proposed definition
of a generalized solution is based on the minimax approach to the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation. We prove the existence of the generalized (minimax) solution
of the mean filed game system using the Nash equilibrium in the auxiliary
differential game with infinitely many identical players. We show that the
minimax solution of the original system provide the ε-Nash equilibrium in the
differential game with finite number of players.
Keywords: Mean-field-games, Hamilton–Jacobi equations, minimax solution, Nash equi-
librium, differential game with infinitely many players.
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1 Introduction
The mean field game approach was proposed independently by J.-M. Lasry and
P.-L. Lions (see [11], [21]–[23]) and by M. Huang, R.P. Malhame´ and P. Caines (see
[12]–[16]). It is used to describe the control process with the N identical weakly
coupled participants by studying the limit case N → ∞. In the limit case the
dynamics and outcome of each player depend on the state of the player, his control
and the distribution of the players on the Euclidian space, while the distribution of
players is determined by the dynamics. This leads to the MFG system consisting of
two PDEs: Hamilton-Jacobi equation and kinetic/Kolmogorov equation. Hamilton–
Jacobi equation describes the evolution of value function; the solution of kinetic
equation determines the distribution of players’ state.
Primary mean field games are studied for the second–order case. This case cor-
responds to stochastic control processes. Note that for stochastic case the mean
field game theory is developed for the nonlinear Markov processes of the general
form [19], [20]. For the information on recent progress of mean field games we refer
to the survey [9] and references therein.
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First-order mean field games were studied for the case when the distribution of
players’ states is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (see [5],
[6], [7], [23], [24]). The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the MFG system is
proved for the case when the dependence on the density of the players’ state distribu-
tion is of nonlocal nature and smoothing [23], or for the case when dependence on the
density of the players’ state distribution is local and Hamiltonian has a superlinear
growth in the gradient variable [6]. The key idea of those works is that the MFG
system is understood as an optimality condition for certain optimization problem.
For some cases the existence can be established using fixed point arguments applied
directly to MFG system [5], [24] (see also [7]).
Another approach is based on a random variables point of view. It was imple-
mented to extended mean field games [10]. In that paper the second (kinetic equa-
tion) is replaced with the system of ODEs. This requires some smoothness of the
Hamiltonian, moreover the coercivity condition is imposed on the conjugate of the
Hamiltonian (see [9], [10]).
In this paper we introduce the notion of a minimax solution of the MFG sys-
tem and prove its existence for the case when the distribution of players’ states can
contains atoms. The main assumption is that the Hamiltonian is continuous and
Lipschitz continuous with respect to gradient variable. The minimax solutions were
proposed for Hamilton–Jacobi equations by Subbotin [27]. The concept of minimax
solution goes back to the notions of stability proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin
for zero-sum differential games [18]. The function of position is a minimax solution
if its epigraph and hypograph are viable under certain differential inclusions. The
definition of the minimax solution to Hamilton–Jacobi equation can be rewritten in
the infinitesimal form [27]. Moreover, the minimax solutions are equivalent to the
viscosity solutions.
The definition of the minimax solution to the MFG system proposed in this paper
means that the Hamilton–Jacobi equation holds in minimax sense, when the kinetic
equation is replaced by the following condition: the distribution of players’ states
is determined by the measure on the set of trajectories viable in the graph of the
solution of Hamilton–Jacobi equation. We prove that the minimax solution coincides
with the classical solution if it exists. Our approach is close to the approach based
random variables formulation [10]. As in that paper the distribution of players is
determined by the measure on trajectories. However, the minimax approach works
in the nonsmooth case.
The key idea of the paper is to consider the game with infinitely many identical
players corresponding to the original MFG system. We prove the existence of Nash
equilibrium for such game. Further, we consider the function equal to the optimal
outcome of the sample player placed at the given position. This function and the
distribution of players’ states given by Nash equilibrium form the minimax solution
of the MFG system. Additionally, we construct the ε-Nash equilibrium in the game
of finite number of players. Here we assume that the players use open–loop random
strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 with the statement of
the problem. Then, in Section 3 we give the notion of minimax solution to the MFG
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system. In Section 4 we derive the necessary conditions for minimax solutions in the
infinitesimal form; in addition, we study the relation between minimax and classical
solutions for MFG systems. Section 5 includes the existence result for the Nash
equilibrium in the auxiliary differential game with infinitely many players. In Section
6 this result is used to prove the existence of the minimax solution to the original
MFG system. Finally, Section 7 presents the construction of the approximate Nash
equilibrium for the finitely many players differential game.
2 Setting the Problem
2.1 Mean Field Game System
We consider the first-order mean field game system
∂V
∂t
+H(t, x, µ[t],∇V ) = 0, V (T, ·) = σ(·) (1)
d
dt
µ[t] = µ[t]
〈
∂H
∂p
(t, x, µ[t],∇V ),∇
〉
, µ[0] = m0(·). (2)
Here t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn, V is a function from [0, T ]×Rn to R, µ[·] is a measure-valued
function of t, i.e. for all t µ[t] is a probabilistic measure on Rn, ∂H/∂p denotes the
derivative of the Hamiltonian H with respect to 4th variable. We don’t assume that
µ[t] is absolute continuous.
Below we consider the case when V isn’t smooth and it satisfies equation (1) in
minimax (viscosity) sense. The kinetic equation is replaced with the condition which
doesn’t require the existence of ∂H/∂p.
The kinetic equation (2) is written in the operator form. In this form the MFG
systems were studied in [19], [20] for stochastic case under some smoothness condi-
tions on coefficients. Equation (2) is the kinetic equation used in [19], [20] in the case
when the terms corresponding to jumps and Brownian motion are equal to 0.
Note that if µ[t] is a absolute continuous and q(t, ·) is its density, then the kinetic
equation (2) takes the form
∂q
∂t
+ div
(
q
∂H(t, x, µ,∇V )
∂p
)
= 0, q(0, ·) = q0(·). (3)
Here q0 is a density of the measure m0.
2.2 Notions and Assumptions
We consider an element of Rn+1 as a pair (x, z), x ∈ Rn, z ∈ R. Put
proj1(x, z) , x.
If S is a Banach space, then C(S) is the space of continuous functions from S to
R, Cb(S) is the space of bounded function S → R. The spaces C(S) and Cb(S) are
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equipped with the uniform norm ‖ϕ‖ = sups∈S |ϕ(s)|. Further, C
k(S) is the space of
k-times continuously differentiable functions S → R, Ckb (S) is the space of k-times
continuously differentiable functions S → R such that any its partial derivative is
bounded.
Denote by C([0, T ],Rn+1) the space of all continuous functions (x(·), z(·)) :
[0, T ]→ Rn+1. The norm on C([0, T ],Rn+1) is given by
‖(x(·), z(·))‖ = sup
t∈[0,T ]
(‖x(t)‖ + |z(t)|).
If (x(·), z(·)) ∈ C([0, T ],Rn+1), then put
et(x(·), z(·)) = x(t).
We denote the Borel σ-algebra on S by B(S). If m is a Borel measure on S, then
supp(m) denotes the support of m. If R is a Banach space and h is a Borel map from
S to R, then h#m denotes an image measure of m by h:∫
R
ϕ(r)(h#m)(dr) =
∫
S
ϕ(h(s))m(ds) ∀φ ∈ Cb(R).
The set of all Borel probability measures on S is denoted by P(S). We endow the
set P(Rn) with the weak topology. This topology is generated by the Kantorovich–
Rubinstein distance [28]:
W (m′, m′′) = sup
{∫
Rn
φd(m′ −m′′) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
= inf
pi∈Π(m′,m′′)
∫
Rn×Rn
‖x′ − x′′‖π(dx′, dx′′).
Here
Lip1 = {φ : |φ(x
′)− φ(x′′)| ≤ ‖x′ − x′′‖},
Π(m′, m′′) denotes the set of probabilistic measures π on Rn × Rn such that π(Y ×
R
n) = m′(Y ), π(Rn × Y ) = m′′(Y ) for all measurable A ⊂ Rn.
Let M be the set of all continuous functions µ : [0, T ]→ P(Rn). If µ ∈M, then
µ[t] is a distribution of players at time t. If µ, ν ∈ M, then define W(µ, ν) by the
rule
W(µ, ν) , sup
t∈[0,T ]
W (µ[t], ν[t]).
Note that W is a distance, and M is a Banach space. The measure-valued function
µ ∈M can be considered as an external field for the Hamilton–Jacobi equation (1).
We assume that
H(t, x,m, p) = max
u∈P
[〈p, f(t, x,m, u)〉 − g(t, x,m, u)].
Here m is a probabilistic measure on Rn, the variable p denotes ∇V .
We assume that the following conditions hold true.
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1. P is compact;
2. f and g are continuous;
3. f is Lipschitz continuous with respect x and m, i.e. there exist constants Lf,x
and Lf,m such that
‖f(t, x′, m, u)− f(t, x′′, m, u)‖ ≤ Lf,x‖x
′ − x′′‖,
‖f(t, x,m′, u)− f(t, x,m′′, u)‖ ≤ Lf,mW (m
′, m′′);
4. σ is continuous;
5. the support of the measure m0 is a compact set G0 ⊂ R
n.
There exists a compact set G ⊂ Rn such that for each external field µ, control u
and the function x(·) satisfying the condition
x˙ = f(t, x, µ[t], u(t)), x(0) ∈ G0
the inclusion x(t) ∈ G holds true for t ∈ [0, T ]. Put
K , sup{‖f(t, x,m, u)‖ : t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ G,m ∈ P(E), u ∈ P}. (4)
Since G, P and P(G) are compact, K is finite.
3 Minimax Solution
The solution of equation (1) can be nonsmooth even if H is smooth [27]. In this
case equation (1) should be satisfied in the minimax (viscosity) sense. There exist
several (equivalent) definitions of minimax solution [27]. We will use the definition
involving the notion of viability.
Let multivalued maps (t, x,m) 7→ E−(t, x,m) ⊂ Rn+1 and (t, x,m, a) 7→
E+(t, x,m, a) ⊂ Rn+1, a ∈ A satisfy the following conditions
(E1) the sets E−(t, x,m) and E+(t, x,m, a) are nonempty, closed and convex;
(E2) the multivalued function (t, x,m) 7→ E−(t, x,m) is upper semicontinuous; for
all a the mapping (t, x,m) 7→ E+(t, x,m, a) is upper semicontinuous.
(E3) H(t, x,m, p) = max{〈p, ξ〉+ ζ : (ξ, ζ) ∈ E−(t, x,m)};
(E4) for any t, x,m and p there exists a∗ ∈ A such that
H(t, x,m, p) = min{〈p, ξ〉+ ζ : (ξ, ζ) ∈ E+(t, x,m, a∗)}
≥ min{〈p, ξ〉+ ζ : (ξ, ζ) ∈ E+(t, x,m, a)}, ∀a ∈ A.
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One can define maps E− and E+ by the rule
E−(t, x,m) = co{(f(t, x,m, u), g(t, x,m, u)) : u ∈ P},
E+(t, x,m, u) = {(f(t, x,m, u), g(t, x,m, u))}.
In this case the index set A is equal to P .
The function V is a minimax solution for the given external field µ ∈M (see [27,
Definitions M3, U2, and L2]) iff
i. V (T, ·) = σ(·, µ[T ]);
ii. for any a ∈ A the epigraph of V is viable under the differential inclusion
(x˙, z˙) ∈ E+(t, x(t), µ[t], a);
iii. the hypograph of V is viable under differential inclusion
(x˙, z˙) ∈ E−(t, x, µ[t]). (5)
Note that the definition of a minimax solution doesn’t depend on the choice of
the maps E− and E+ [27].
Both conditions can be rewritten in the infinitesimal form [27, Theorem 6.4].
First, let us introduce the upper Hadamard derivative d+ and lower Hadamard deriva-
tive d−.
d−V (t, x, α, ξ) = lim inf
δ↓0,α′→α,ξ′→ξ
V (t+ δα′, x+ δξ′)− V (t, x)
δ
,
d+V (t, x, α, ξ) = lim sup
δ↓0,α′→α,ξ′→ξ
V (t+ δα′, x+ δξ′)− V (t, x)
δ
.
The equivalent definition of the minimax solution is the following. The function
V is a minimax solution of equation (1) iff
i. V (T, ·) = σ(·, µ[T ]);
ii. inf{d+V (t, x, 1, ξ)− ζ : (ξ, ζ) ∈ E−(t, x, µ[t])} ≥ 0;
iii. for each a ∈ A sup{d−V (t, x, 1, ξ)− ζ : (ξ, ζ) ∈ E+(t, x, µ[t], a)} ≤ 0.
Note that V is a minimax solution of equation (1) if and only if for any (t0, x0) ∈
[0, T ]× Rn V (t0, x0) is a value of the control problem
maximize J(x(·), u(·), µ) = σ(x(T ), µ[T ])−
∫ T
t0
g(t, x(t), µ[t], u(t))dt
subject to
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), µ[t], u(t)), x(t0) = x0.
For a function of position V and an external field µ put
S[V, µ] , {(x(·), z(·)) : (x˙(t), z˙(t)) ∈ E−(t, x(t), µ[t]), z(t) = V (t, x(t))}.
The set S[V, µ] is a set of solutions of the inclusion (x˙, z˙) ∈ E−(t, x, µ[t]) viable in
grV .
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Definition 1. We say that (V, µ) ∈ C([0, T ] × Rn) ×M is a minimax solution of
system (1), (2) iff
1. V is a minimax solution of equation (1);
2. µ[0] = m0
3. there exists a measure χ on S[V, µ] such that µ[t] = et#χ, i.e. for any φ ∈
C1[0, T ] the following equality holds true:∫
Rn
φ(x)µ[t](dx) =
∫
S[V,µ]
φ(x(t))χ(d(x(·), z(·))).
Note that the definition doesn’t depend on the choice of the maps E− and E+.
Indeed, denote
H∗(t, x,m, ξ) = sup
p∈Rn
[〈ξ, p〉 −H(t, x,m, p)].
We have that
{ξ ∈ Rn : there exists ζ such that (ξ, ζ) ∈ E−(t, x,m)} = H(t, x,m)
= {ξ ∈ Rn : H∗(t, x,m, ξ) <∞} .
Moreover, if (ξ, ζ) ∈ E−(t, x,m), then ζ ≥ H∗(t, x,m, ξ), and the pair
(ξ,H∗(t, x,m, ξ)) is an element of E−(t, x,m). Therefore, the set S[V, µ] consists
of the solutions for the inclusion
(x˙(t), z˙(t)) ∈ {(ξ, ζ) : ξ ∈ F(t, x, µ[t]), ζ = H∗(t, x,m, ξ)}.
It is determined only by the Hamiltonian H .
In Section 6 the existence theorem for the minimax solution of system (1), (2) is
proved.
4 Properties of Minimax Solution
For brevity, denote by T V (t, x) the tangent cone at (t, x) to grV :
T V (t, x) =
{
(v, s) : lim inf
δ↓0
∣∣∣∣V (t + δ, x+ δv)δ − s
∣∣∣∣ = 0
}
.
Proposition 1. If (V, µ) is a minimax solution to system (1), (2), then there exists
a measurable function b(t, x) such that b(t, x) ∈ proj1(coT V (t, x, µ) ∩ E
−(t, x, µ[t]))
and
d
dt
∫
Rn
φ(x)µ[t](dx) =
∫
Rn
〈b(t, x),∇φ(x)〉µ[t](dx) ∀φ ∈ C10 (R
n). (6)
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Proof. We may assume that for any (x(·), z(·)) ∈ S[V, µ] and t ∈ [0, T ] (x˙(t), z˙(t)) ∈
T V (t, x(t)). Indeed, since the motion from S[V, µ] is viable in grV we have that
(x˙(t), z˙(t)) ∈ T V (t, x) for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
If φ ∈ C10 (R
n), (x(·), z(·)) ∈ S[V, µ], then
d
dt
φ(x(t)) = 〈∇φ(x(t)), x˙(t)〉 a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
Therefore, for any ψ ∈ C1([0, T ]) such that ψ(0) = ψ(T ) = 0 we have that
∫ T
0
ψ(t)
d
dt
φ(x(t))dt =
∫ T
0
ψ(t)〈∇φ(x(t)), x˙(t)〉dt.
Further,
−
∫
S[V,µ]
∫ T
0
ψ′(t)φ(x(t))dtχ(d(x(·), z(·)))
=
∫
S[V,µ]
∫ T
0
ψ(t)〈∇φ(x(t)), x˙(t)〉dtχ(d(x(·), z(·))).
Using Fubini’s Theorem we get
−
∫ T
0
∫
S[V,µ]
ψ′(t)φ(x(t))χ(d(x(·), z(·)))dt
=
∫
S[V,µ]
∫ T
0
ψ(t)〈∇φ(x(t)), x˙(t)〉dtχ(d(x(·), z(·))). (7)
Let
S[V, t∗, x∗, µ] = {(x(·), z(·)) ∈ S[V, µ] : x(t∗) = x∗}.
It follows from [4, Theorem 10.4.6] that there exists a system of measures χt∗,x∗ on
S[V, t∗, x∗, µ] such that for all ϕ ∈ Cb(S[V, µ])
∫
S[V,µ]
ϕ(x(·), z(·))χ(d(x(·), z(·)))
=
∫ T
0
dt∗
∫
Rn
µ[t∗](dx∗)
∫
S[V,t∗,x∗,µ]
ϕ(x(·), z(·))χt∗,x∗(d(x(·), z(·))).
Applying this formula to (7) we get the equality
−
∫ T
0
ψ′(t)
∫
Rn
φ(x)µ[t](dx)dt
=
∫ T
0
dt∗ψ(t∗)
∫
Rn
µ[t∗](dx∗)
∫
S[V,t∗,x∗,µ]
〈∇φ(x(t∗)), x˙(t∗)〉χt∗,x∗(d(x(·), z(·))).
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Denote
b(t∗, x∗) ,
∫
S[V,t∗,x∗,µ]
x˙(t∗)χt∗,x∗(d(x(·), z(·))).
We have that b(t∗, x∗) ∈ proj1(coT V (t∗, x∗, µ) ∩ E
−(t∗, x∗, µ[t])), and
−
∫ T
0
ψ′(t)
∫
Rn
φ(x)µ[t∗](dx)dt=
∫ T
0
ψ(t)
∫
Rn
〈∇φ(x), b(t, x)〉µ[t](dx)dt.
We say that V is a classical solution of (1) for a given external field µ if V is
differentiable and satisfies equation (1) at any position (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn. If there
exists ∂H/∂p and V is differentiable we say that µ is a weak solution of (2) if for all
φ ∈ C1b (R
n) and ψ ∈ C1b ([0, T ]) such that ψ(0) = ψ(T ) = 0 the following equality is
valid:
−
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
ψ′(t)φ(x)µ[t](dx)dt
=
∫ T
0
∫
Rn
ψ(t)
〈
∂H
∂p
(t, x, µ[t],∇V (t, x)),∇φ(x)
〉
µ[t](dx)dt.
Proposition 2. Assume that (V, µ) is a minimax solution to system (1),(2), there
exists ∂H/∂p and V is differentiable. Then V is a classical solution of equation (1)
and µ satisfies equation (2) in the weak sense.
Proof. Note that the first statement of the Proposition is proved in [27, §2.4]. If V
is differentiable, then
d+V (t, x, 1, ξ) = d−V (t, x, 1, ξ) =
∂V
∂t
+ 〈∇V, ξ〉.
Since V is a minimax solution of (1), we have that there exists u∗ ∈ P such that
∂V
∂t
+ 〈∇V, f(t, x, µ[t], u∗)〉 − g(t, x, µ[t], u∗)) ≥ 0,
and for all u ∈ P
∂V
∂t
+ 〈∇V, f(t, x, µ[t], u)〉 − g(t, x, µ[t], u)) ≤ 0.
This means, that V is a classical solution of equation (1). Moreover, T V (t, x, µ) =
{f(t, x, µ[t], u∗), g(t, x, µ[t], u∗)}. Therefore, condition (6) takes the form
d
dt
∫
Rn
φ(x)µ[t](dx) =
∫
Rn
〈f(t, x, µ[t], u∗),∇φ(x)〉µ[t](dx) ∀ϕ ∈ C
1
0(R
n).
Further, under assumptions of the Proposition
∂H
∂p
(t, x, µ[t],∇V (t, x)) = f(t, x, µ[t], u∗),
we obtain that equation (2) is valid in the weak sense.
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Proposition 3. Assume that
• H is differentiable with respect to p;
• V is a classical solution of equation (1), and ∇V is Lipschitz continuous with
respect to x;
• µ is a weak solution of (2).
Then (V, µ) is a minimax solution to system (1), (2)
Proof. Let x∗(·, x0) be a solution of the initial value problem
x˙ =
∂H
∂p
(t, x, µ[t],∇V (t, x)), x(0) = x0.
Further, denote
z∗(·, x0) = V (0, x0) +
∫ t
0
H∗(t, x∗(t, x0), µ[t], x˙∗(t, x0))dt.
Note thatH∗(t, x∗(t, x0), µ[t], x˙∗(t, x0)) = −g(t, x∗(t, x0), µ[t], x˙∗(t, x0)). We have that
S[V, µ] = {(x∗(·, x0), z∗(·, x0)) : x0 ∈ R
n}.
Define the measure χ by the rule
χ(Y ) = m0{x0 : (x∗(·, x0), z∗(·, x0)) ∈ Y }.
Put ν[t] = et#χ. We have that ν is a weak solution of the equation
d
dt
ν[t] =
〈
∂H
∂p
(t, x, µ[t],∇V (t, x)),∇
〉
ν[t]. (8)
By assumption µ is also a solution of equation (8). From [19, Theorem 2.3 and
Proposition 4.2] we conclude that µ = ν.
5 Games with Infinitely Many Players
In this section we introduce the games with infinitely many players in the case
when the dynamics and the outcome of each player depend only on the state of the
player, his control and the distribution of players’ states. First static games with
infinitely many players were considered in [2], [3], [29]; the review of games with
infinitely many players can be found in [17]. The basic constructions of dynamical
games with infinitely many players were first proposed in [25].
Let Ω be a set of players. We assume that Ω is a compact metric space. Denote
the metric on Ω by dΩ. Further, let η be a nonatomic measure on Ω, x0 : Ω→ G0 be
a continuous function.
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Let the state of player ω at time t x[t, ω] satisfy the equation
d
dt
x[t, ω] = f(t, x[t, ω], µ[t], u(t)), x(0) = x0(ω), u(t) ∈ P, t ∈ [0, T ]. (9)
Here µ[t] is a distribution of players’ states at time t. It is given by the equality
µ[t] = x[t, ·]#η.
If u is a control of player ω, then his outcome is
J [x[·, ω], u, µ] , σ(x[T, ω], µ[T ])−
∫ T
0
g(t, x[t, ω], µ[t], u(t))dt. (10)
Each player wants to maximize his own payoff.
Having system (1), (2) we can construct the differential game with dynamics (9)
and outcome (10) by setting Ω , G0 × [0, 1], η , m0 × λ, and x0(ω
′, ω′′) , ω′ for
ω = (ω′, ω′′), ω′ ∈ G0, ω
′′ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the proposed approach admits the case
when the initial measure m0 contains atoms.
Note that the maximum in (10) may not be achieved. To relax problem (9), (10)
we introduce the following construction proposed in [8]. Let S and R be a compact
metric spaces. The set C(S×R) is a separable metric space. Let ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . be dense
in C(S × R). If κ ∈ P(S ×R), then define the weak norm of κ by the rule
‖κ‖w ,
∞∑
j=1
|〈ϕj,κ〉|
2j(1 + ‖ϕj‖)
.
Here
〈ϕ,κ〉 =
∫
S×R
ϕ(s, r)κ(d(s, r)).
The set P(S×R) with the norm ‖·‖w is compact. Moreover ‖κi−κ‖ → 0, as i→∞
if and only if κi converges to κ in the weak sense.
Now let θ be a nonatomic Borel measure on S. Denote
Λ(S, θ, R) , {κ ∈ P(S × R) : κ(Y × R) = θ(Y )}.
The set Λ(S, θ, R) is also compact.
Recall [4, Theorem 10.4.6] that for each κ ∈ Λ(S, θ, R) there exists a function
h : S → P(R) such that for any ϕ ∈ C(S × R) the function
s 7→
∫
R
ϕ(s, t)h(s)(dr) is measurable (11)
and ∫
S
θ(ds)
∫
R
ϕ(s, r)h(s)(dr) =
∫
S×R
ϕ(s, r)κ(d(s, r)). (12)
Below we use the denotation
∂κ
∂θ
(s, dr) = h(s)(dr).
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Conversely, if h satisfies condition (11), then there exists a measure κ ∈ Λ(S, θ, R)
such that condition (12) holds.
Denote U = Λ([0, T ], λ, P ). Here λ is Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Elements of
U are control measures. If α ∈ U , µ ∈ M, ω ∈ Ω, then the corresponding motion
x[·, ω, α, µ] is a solution of the equation
x(t) = x0(ω) +
∫
[0,t]×P
f(τ, x(τ), µ[τ ], u)α(d(τ, u)).
Moreover, the outcome of player ω playing with the control measure α is
J [ω, α, µ] = σ(x[T, ω, α, µ], µ[T ])−
∫
[0,T ]×P
g(τ, x[τ, ω, α, µ], µ[τ ], u)α(d(τ, u)).
The approach based on control measures is equivalent to the approach based on
measure-valued controls proposed by Warga [30]. Indeed, if h = ∂α
∂λ
is a measure-
valued control, then x[·, ω, α, µ] is a solution of initial value problem
x˙ =
∫
P
f(t, x(t), µ[t], u)h(t, du), x(0) = x0(ω).
Analogously,
J [ω, α, µ] = σ(x[T, ω, α, µ], µ[T ])−
∫ T
0
∫
P
g(τ, x[τ, ω, α, µ], µ[τ ], u)h(t, du)dt.
Below we use the construction analogous to the mixed strategies in the theory of
static games with the finite number of players. Denote D = Λ(Ω, η,U). The elements
of D are the profile of open–loop strategies, i.e. if γ ∈ D, then for η-almost every
ω ∈ Ω ∂γ/∂η(ω, ·) is a distribution of controls chosen by player ω.
Definition 2. We say that the pair X [γ] = (y, µ) is a process generated by the
profile of strategies γ if y : [0, T ]×Ω×U → Rn and µ ∈M are such that y[·, ω, α] =
x[·, ω, α, µ] for all α ∈ U , ω ∈ Ω and µ[t] = y[t, ·, ·]#γ.
Recall that the equality µ[t] = y[t, ·, ·]#γ can be rewritten in the following way:∫
Rn
φ(x)µ[t](dx) =
∫
Ω×U
φ(y[t, ω, α])γ(d(ω, α)), ∀φ ∈ Cb(R
n).
Put
M′ , {µ ∈M : µ[t] ∈ P(G), W (µ(t′, ·), µ(t′′, ·)) ≤ K|t′ − t′′|}.
Here K is defined by (4). The set M′ is convex and compact.
Proposition 4. For each profile of strategies γ there exists a unique process X [γ].
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Proof. Let us introduce the operator A :M′ →M′. Put A(µ)[t] , x[t, ·, ·, µ]#γ, i.e.
ν = A(µ) if∫
Rn
φ(x)ν[t](dx) =
∫
Ω×U
φ(x[t, ω, α, µ])γ(d(ω, α)), ∀φ ∈ Cb(R
n). (13)
Let us show that ν = A(µ) ∈M′. Let φ(x) = 0 on G. Then∫
Rn
φ(x)ν[t](dx) = 0.
This means that supp(ν[t]) ⊂ G. Further, for φ ≥ 0∫
Rn
φ(x)ν(dx) ≥ 0, and
∫
Rn
1ν[t](dx) = 1.
Hence, ν[t] ∈ P(G).
Now let t′, t′′ ∈ [0, T ], t′′ > t′. We have that
x[t′′, ω, α, µ] = x[t′, ω, α, µ] +
∫
[t′,t′′]×P
f(τ, x[τ, ω, α, µ], µ[τ ], u)α(d(τ, u)).
Thus,
‖x[t′′, ω, α, µ]− x[t′, ω, α, µ]‖ ≤ K|t′′ − t′|.
Further,
W (ν(t′′, ·), ν(t′, ·)) = sup
{∫
Rn
φ(x)ν(t′′, dx)−
∫
Rn
φ(x)ν(t′, dx) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
= sup
{∫
Ω×U
[φ(x[t′′, ω, α, µ])− φ(x[t′, ω, α, µ])]γ(d(ω, α)) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
≤ K|t′′ − t′|.
Hence, the operator A is well-defined.
Now let us show that A is continuous. Let µ1, µ2 ∈M
′. We have that
‖x[t, ω, α, µ1]− x[t, ω, α, µ2]‖
≤
∫ t
0
Lf,x‖x[τ, ω, α, µ1]− x[τ, ω, α, µ2]‖dτ +
∫ t
0
Lf,mW (µ1[τ ], µ2[τ ])dτ.
Using Gronwall’s inequality we get
‖x[t, ω, α, µ1]− x[t, ω, α, µ2]‖ ≤ e
Lf,xTLf,m
∫ t
0
W (µ1[τ ], µ2[τ ])dτ. (14)
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Denote C1 = e
Lf,xTLf,m. Since
W (A(µ1)[t], A(µ2)[t])
= sup
{∫
Ω×U
(φ(x[t, ω, α, µ1])− φ(x[t, ω, α, µ2]))γ(d(ω, α)) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
,
we have that
W (A(µ1)[t], A(µ2)[t]) ≤ C1
∫ t
0
W (µ1[τ ], µ2[τ ])dτ. (15)
Hence,
W(A(µ1), A(µ2)) ≤ C1TW(µ1, µ2).
Since M′ is compact and A :M′ →M is continuous, A admits a fixed point µ∗.
The pair (y∗, µ∗) with y∗ : [0, T ] × U × Ω → Rn given by the equality y∗[·, ω, α] =
x[·, ω, α, µ∗] is a process generated by γ.
Now let us show the uniqueness of X [γ]. Note that if (y, µ) is a process generated
by γ, then µ = A(µ). Let µ1 and µ2 be fixed points of A. Let ϑ be a maximal time
such that µ1[t] = µ2[t] for t ∈ [0, ϑ]. If ϑ < T choose a positive number δ such that
δ < min{T − ϑ, 1/C1}. It follows from (15) that
sup
t∈[θ,ϑ+δ]
W (µ1[t], µ2[t]) ≤ C1δ sup
t∈[ϑ,ϑ+δ]
W (µ1[t], µ2[t]).
Therefore, W (µ1[t], µ2[t]) = 0 for t ∈ [ϑ, ϑ + δ]. This contradicts with the choice
of ϑ.
Definition 3. We say that γˆ is a Nash equilibrium profile if for (yˆ, µˆ) = X [γˆ],
η-almost all ω ∈ Ω and for all ̺ ∈ P(U) the following inequality if fulfilled∫
U
J [ω, α, µˆ]̺(dα) ≤
∫
U
J [ω, α, µˆ]
∂γˆ
∂η
(ω, dα). (16)
Denote
E(ω, µ) = Argmax{J [ω, α, µ] : α ∈ U}, E(µ) = {(ω, α) : α ∈ E(ω, µ)}.
The set E(µ) is closed.
Proposition 5. The profile γˆ is a Nash equilibrium, if and only if supp(γˆ) ⊂ E(µˆ)
for (yˆ, µˆ) = X [γˆ].
Proof. First assume that γˆ is a Nash equilibrium. Let Ω+[γˆ] be a set of ω ∈ Ω such
that inequality (16) holds. Since γˆ is a Nash equilibrium, η(Ω \Ω+[γˆ]) = 0. For each
ω ∈ Ω+[γ] the following inclusion holds
supp
(
∂γˆ
∂η
(ω, ·)
)
⊂ E(ω, µˆ).
Let ϕ ∈ C(Ω× U) be such that ϕ(ω, α) = 0 for (ω, α) ∈ E(µˆ).
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We have that∫
Ω×U
ϕ(ω, α)γˆ(d(ω, α)) =
∫
Ω+
η(dω)
∫
U
ϕ(ω, α)
∂γˆ
∂η
(ω, dα) = 0.
Therefore, supp(γˆ) ⊂ E(µˆ).
Now assume that supp(γˆ) ⊂ E(µˆ) for (yˆ, µˆ) = X [γˆ]. This mean that for η-
almost all ω ∈ Ω supp(∂γˆ/∂η(ω, ·)) ⊂ E(ω, µ). Therefore, for η-almost all ω ∈ Ω, all
α ∈ supp(∂γˆ
∂η
(ω, ·)) and all β ∈ U
J [ω, β, µˆ] ≤ J [ω, α, µˆ].
Integration of this inequality with respect to the measure ∂γˆ
∂η
(ω, dα) and with respect
to the measure ̺(dβ) gives inequality (16).
Theorem 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium profile of strategies.
Proof. To prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium profile we construct the multi-
valued map such that its fixed points are Nash equilibria in the game with infinitely
many players.
First let us define the function B : M′ × D → M′ by the following rule: ν =
B(µ, γ) if ν[t] = x[t, ·, ·, µ]#γ, i.e.∫
Rn
φ(x)ν[t](dx) =
∫
Ω×U
φ(x[t, ω, α, µ])γ(d(ω, α)) ∀φ ∈ Cb(R
n). (17)
The function B is well-defined (the proof is analogous to the proof of correctness of
the definition of A in the proof of Proposition 4).
Now let us show that B is continuous. Assume the converse. This means that
there exist µk → µ, γk → γ, as k →∞ such that
lim
k→∞
W(B(µk, γk), B(µ, γ)) = lim
k→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
W (B(µk, γk)[t], B(µ, γ)[t]) > 0.
By extracting subsequences we can assume that there exists t ∈ [0, T ] satisfying
the property
lim
k→∞
W (B(µk, γk)[t], B(µ, γ)[t]) > 0. (18)
Recall that
W (B(µk, γk)[t], B(µ, γ)[t])
= sup
{∫
Rn
φ(x)B(µk, γk)[t](dx)−
∫
Rn
φ(x)B(µ, γ)[t](dx) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
.
Therefore, (18) can be reformulated in the following way: there exists a sequence
{φk} ⊂ Lip1 ∩ C(G) such that
lim
k→∞
[∫
G
φk(x)B(µk, γk)[t](dx)−
∫
G
φk(x)B(µ, γ)[t](dx)
]
> 0.
15
Without loss of generality we can assume that there exists a function φ∗ ∈ Lip1 ∩
C(G) such that ‖φk − φ∗‖ → 0, as k →∞.
We have that∫
G
φk(x)B(µk, γk)[t](dx)−
∫
G
φk(x)B(µ, γ)[t](dx)
=
∫
Ω×U
φk(x[t, ω, α, µk])γk(d(ω, α))−
∫
Ω×U
φk(x[t, ω, α, µ])γ(d(ω, α))
=
∫
Ω×U
φk(x[t, ω, α, µk])γk(d(ω, α))−
∫
Ω×U
φk(x[t, ω, α, µ])γk(d(ω, α))
+
∫
Ω×U
φk(x[t, ω, α, µ])γk(d(ω, α))−
∫
Ω×U
φ∗(x[t, ω, α, µ])γk(d(ω, α))
+
∫
Ω×U
φ∗(x[t, ω, α, µ])γk(d(ω, α))−
∫
Ω×U
φ∗(x[t, ω, α, µ])γ(d(ω, α))
+
∫
Ω×U
φ∗(x[t, ω, α, µ])γ(d(ω, α))−
∫
Ω×U
φk(x[t, ω, α, µ])γ(d(ω, α)).
From this and (14) we get the inequality
W (B(µk, γk)[t], B(µ, γ)[t]) ≤ C1TW(µk, µ) + 2‖φk − φ∗‖
+
[∫
Ω×U
φ∗(x[t, ω, α, µ])γk(d(ω, α))−
∫
Ω×U
φ∗(x[t, ω, α, µ])γ(d(ω, α))
]
.
Since for all ϕ ∈ C(Ω× U)∫
Ω×U
ϕ(ω, α)γk(d(ω, α))→
∫
Ω×U
ϕ(ω, α)γ(d(ω, α))
we obtain that
lim
k→∞
W (B(µk, γk)[t], B(µ, γ)[t]) = 0.
This contradicts with (18). Thus, B is continuous.
Now let F(µ) be a set of all profiles ξ ∈ D such that supp(ξ) ⊂ E(µ). The set F(µ)
is nonempty. Indeed, since the correspondence ω 7→ E(ω, µ) is upper semicontinuous,
E(ω, µ) admits a measurable selector α∗(ω, µ). Define the measure ξ∗ by the rule∫
Ω×U
ϕ(ω, α)ξ∗(d(ω, α)) =
∫
Ω
ϕ(ω, α∗(ω, µ))η(dω).
We have that supp(ξ∗) ∈ E(µ). Thus, ξ∗ ∈ F(µ).
Moreover, F(µ) is convex.
Further we shall prove the closeness of the graph of the mapping F .
Let µk → µ, ξk → ξ, ξk ∈ F(µk). We shall show that ξ ∈ F(µ). It suffices to
show that supp(ξ) ⊂ E(µ). Assume the converse. Let there exist a set Q ⊂ Ω × U
such that Q ∩ E(µ) = ∅ and ξ(Q) > 0. We can choose Q to be compact. Since E(µ)
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is compact also, there exists ε such that the set Qε = {(ω, α) : d((ω, α), Q) ≤ ε}
doesn’t intersect with E(µ). Here d is a distance between (ω, α) and Q:
d((ω, α), Q) = min{dΩ(ω, ω
′) + ‖α− α′‖w : (ω
′, α′) ∈ Q}.
There exists N such that Qε ∩ E(µk) = ∅ for all k > N . In the contrary case
there exists a sequence {kl} such that (ωkl, αkl) ∈ Qε ∩ E(µkl). We can assume that
(ωkl, αkl) → (ω
∗, α∗), as l → ∞. Since the dependence µ 7→ E(µ) is upper semicon-
tinuous we have that (ω∗, α∗) ∈ Qε ∩ E(µ). This contradicts with the emptiness of
Qε ∩ E(µ).
Now let ϕ ∈ C(Ω× U) be such that ϕ = 1 on Q and ϕ = 0 outside Qε. We have
that∫
Ω×U
ϕ(ω, α)ξk(d(ω, α)) = 0, k > N, and
∫
Ω×U
ϕ(ω, α)ξ(d(ω, α)) ≥ ξ(Q) > 0.
This contradicts with the assumption of weak convergence of the sequence {ξk} to ξ.
Thus, ξ ∈ F(µ).
Define the multi-valued map G :M′ × U ⊸M′ × U by the rule
G(µ, γ) , {(ν, ξ) : ν = B(µ, γ), ξ ∈ F(µ)}.
The map G is upper semicontinuous. The set M′ × U is compact. Therefore, by
Kakutani–Fan–Glicksberg theorem there exists a fixed point of G. Denote it by
(µˆ, γˆ). Since µˆ = B(µˆ, γˆ) we have that the pair (yˆ, µˆ) = X [γˆ]. Here yˆ is such that
yˆ[·, ω, α] = x[·, ω, α, µˆ]. Further, since supp(γˆ) ⊂ E(µˆ) inequality (16) holds.
6 Existence of the Solution of MFG System
Theorem 2. There exists a minimax solution (V, µ) of system (1), (2).
Before we prove the theorem, let us fix some notation. If µ is an external field,
α ∈ U , (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ] × R
n, then denote by x(·, t∗, x∗, α, µ) the solution of the
equation
x(t) = x∗ +
∫
[t∗,t]×P
f(τ, x(τ), µ[τ ], u)α(d(τ, u)).
In addition, put
w(t, t∗, x∗, α, µ) = −
∫
[t∗,t]×P
g(t, x(τ, t∗, x∗, α, µ), µ[t], u)α(d(τ, u)).
Further, if γˆ is a Nash equilibrium with X [γˆ] = (yˆ, µˆ) denote
xˆ(·, t∗, x∗, α) = x(·, t∗, x∗, α, µˆ), wˆ(t, t∗, x∗, α) = w(t, t∗, x∗, α, µˆ).
Define the value function V by the rule
V (t∗, x∗) = max{σ(xˆ(T, t∗, x∗, α), µˆ[T ]) + wˆ(T, t∗, x∗, α) : α ∈ U}. (19)
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The number V (t∗, x∗) is an optimal outcome of the sampling player placed in the
initial time t∗ at the position x∗ in the case when the external field is µˆ.
Since the initial state of player ω is x0(ω) we have that V (0, x0(ω)) =
max{J [ω, α, µˆ] : α ∈ U}.
Define the measure χ on C([0, T ],Rn+1) by the rule: for any measurable set
Y ⊂ C([0, T ],Rn+1)
χ(Y ) = γˆ{(ω, α) : (yˆ[·, ω, α], V (·, y[·, ω, α]) ∈ Y }.
The measure χ is used for examination whether the pair (V, µˆ) is a generalized solution
of system (1), (2).
Proof of Theorem 2. First, let us recall that for given system system (1), (2) we can
define the differential game with infinitely many players with dynamics (9) and the
payoff given by (10). To do this put Ω = G0 × [0, 1], η = m0 × λ. If ω = (ω
′, ω′′),
ω′ ∈ G0, ω
′′ ∈ [0, 1], then put x0(ω) = ω
′. There exists an equilibrium γˆ, let
(yˆ, µˆ) = X [γˆ].
Note that V defined by rule (19) is the unique solution of equation (1) for µ = µˆ.
The support of the measure χ is the set of solutions to (5) viable in the graph of V .
The measure µˆ[t] is an image of χ by the map et.
7 Approximate Equilibrium in the Game with Fi-
nite Number of Players
In this section we work with the additional assumption: σ and g are Lipschitz
continuous with respect to phase variable and measure: i.e. there exist constants
Lσ,x, Lσ,m, Lg,x and Lg,m such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], x
′, x′′ ∈ G, m,m′′ ∈ P(G), u ∈ P
|σ(x′, m′)− σ(x′′, m′′)| ≤ Lσ,x‖x
′ − x′′‖+ Lσ,mW (m
′, m′′),
|g(t, x′, m′, u)− g(t, x′′, m′′, u)| ≤ Lg,x‖x
′ − x′′‖+ Lg,mW (m
′, m′′).
If x = (x1N,0, . . . , x
N
N,0) ∈ (G0)
N , then denote
δN
x
=
1
N
(δx1
N,0
+ . . .+ δxN
N,0
).
Here δx denote the Dirac measure concentrated at x.
Lemma 1. There exist measures m1N , . . . , m
N
N such that
i. m0 = m
1
N + . . .+m
N
N ;
ii. miN(G0) = 1/N ;
iii.
W (m0, δ
N
x
) =
N∑
i=1
∫
G0
‖x− xiN,0‖m
i
N (dx).
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Proof. We have that
W (m0, δ
N
x
) = inf
{∫
Rn×Rn
‖x′ − x′′‖π(d(x′, x′′)) : π ∈ Π(m0, δ
N
x
)
}
.
Since supp(m0) and supp(δ
N
x
) are subsets of G0, the supports of all measures of
Π(m0, δ
N
x
) lies in G0 × G0. Recall that G0 is compact. Therefore, there exists a
measure π¯ such that
W (m0, δ
N
x
) =
∫
G0×G0
‖x′ − x′′‖π¯(d(x′, x′′)). (20)
Since π¯(G0 × Y ) = δ
N
x
(Y ) we have that there exists a function h : G0 × B(G0)
such that for any Υ ⊂ G0 ×G0
π¯(Υ) =
∫
Υ2
h(y,Υ1(y))δ
N
x
(dy). (21)
Here
Υ1(y) = {x : ∃y (x, y) ∈ Υ} Υ2 = {y : ∃x (x, y) ∈ Υ}.
Denote
miN (·) =
1
N
h(xiN,0, ·).
From (21) we have that the first and second statements of the Lemma are fulfilled.
Further,
W (m0, δ
N
x
) =
∫
G0
∫
G0
‖x′ − x′′‖h(x′′, dx′)δN
x
(dx′′).
Therefore, the third statement of the Lemma is also fulfilled.
Recall that
S[V, µˆ] = {(x(·), z(·)) : x˙ ∈ E−(t, x, µˆ[t]), z(t) = V (t, x(t))},
S[V, t∗, x∗, µˆ] = {(x(·), z(·)) ∈ S[V, µˆ] : x(t∗) = x∗}.
As it was mentioned above (see the proof of Proposition 1) there exists a system
of measures χ0,x∗ such that for any ϕ ∈ C(S[V, µˆ])∫
S[V,µˆ]
ϕ(x(·), z(·))χ(d(x(·), z(·)))
=
∫
G0
m0(dx∗)
∫
S[V,0,x∗,µˆ]
ϕ(x(·), z(·))χ0,x∗(d(x(·), z(·))).
Define the measure χiN by the rule: for all ϕ ∈ C(S[V, µˆ])∫
S[V,µˆ]
ϕ(x(·), z(·))χiN (x(·), z(·))
=
∫
G0
miN (dx∗)
∫
S[V,0,x∗,µˆ]
ϕ(x(·), z(·))χx∗(d(x(·), z(·))).
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Note that χ = χ1N + . . .+ χ
N
N .
Put µiN [t] = et#χ
i
N . The external field µˆ is a sum of fields µ
i
N , i.e.
µˆ[t] = µ1N [t] + . . .+ µ
N
N [t].
Now let us consider the N player game. Having an external field νN and a control
measure α ∈ U one can consider the motion of the player i given by
xiN (t, α, νN) = x(t, 0, x
i
N,0, α, νN).
The outcome of player i is
J iN(α, νN) = σ(x
i
N (T, α, νN), νN [T ])−
∫
[0,T ]×P
g(t, xiN(t, α, νN), νN [t], u)α(d(t, u))
= σ(x(T, 0, xiN,0, α, νN), νN [T ]) + w(T, 0, x
i
N,0, α, νN).
Below we assume that players use random open–loop strategies, i.e. player i
chooses the distribution of control measures ̺iN ∈ P(U). Denote ̺N = (̺
1
N , . . . , ̺
N
N).
If players use random strategies, then the distribution of the states of player i is given
by the measure νiN (t, ·, ̺N) satisfying the condition∫
Rn
φ(x)νiN(t, dx, ̺N) =
1
N
∫
Rn
φ
(
xiN (t, α, νN(·, ·, ̺N))
)
̺iN (dα).
Here we denote
νN(t, ·, ̺N) =
n∑
i=1
νiN (t, ·, ̺N).
The outcome of player i is
J¯ iN (̺N) =
∫
U
J iN(α, νN(·, ·, ̺N))̺
i
N (dα).
The existence of the motions xiN(·, α, νN) and of distributions of players’ states is
proved as Proposition 4.
Now let us introduce ε-Nash equilibrium profile of strategies. The correspondence
which assigns to the motion (x(·), z(·)) ∈ S[V, µˆ] the set of control measures β such
that
x(·) = xˆ(·, 0, x(0), β), z(·) = σ(x(T ), µˆ) + wˆ(·, 0, x(0), β)
is upper semicontinuous. Let Θ[x(·), z(·)] be its measurable selector.
Let ˆ̺iN be a random strategy such that ˆ̺
i
N = N ·Θ#χ
i
N .
Denote ξˆiN(t, α) = x
i
N (t, α, νN(·, ·, ˆ̺N)). In addition, set
ζˆ iN(t, α) , −
∫
[0,t]×P
g(τ, ξˆiN(·, α), νˆN(·, ·, ˆ̺
i
N), u)α(d(τ, u)),
νˆiN (·, ·) , ν
i
N(·, ·, ρˆN), νˆN(·, ·) , νN (·, ·, ρˆN).
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If player j deviates, i.e. he plays with the strategy ̺jN , then denote the corre-
sponding profile of strategies by ˆ̺N |̺
j
N . Put
ν˜iN |j(·, ·; ̺
j
N) , ν
i
N(·, ·, ˆ̺N |̺
j
N ), ν˜N |j(·, ·; ̺
j
N) , ν˜
1
N |j(·, ·; ̺
j
N) + . . .+ ν˜
N
N |j(·, ·; ̺
j
N).
Moreover, denote ξ˜iN |j(t, α; ̺
j
N) , x
i
N(t, α, ν˜N |j(·, ·, ˜̺
j
N)).
ζ˜ iN |j(t, α; ̺
j
N) , −
∫
[0,t]×P
g(τ, ξ˜iN |j(·, α; ̺
j
N), ν˜
i
N |j(·, ·, ̺
j
N), u)α(d(τ, u)),
Theorem 3. There exist positive constants Cˆ1, Cˆ2, Cˆ3such that for all ̺
j
N ∈ P(U)
J¯ iN(ˆ̺N) ≥ J¯
i
N(ˆ̺N |̺
j
N)− Cˆ1W (m0, δ
N
x
)− Cˆ2N max
i=1,N
∫
G
‖x− xiN,0‖m
i
N(dx)− Cˆ3
1
N
.
In particular, if
W (m0, δ
N
x
)→ 0, N max
i=1,N
∫
G
‖x− xiN,0‖m
i
N(dx)→ 0, N →∞,
then for any ε there exists a number N0 such that for all N > N0 the profile of
strategies ˆ̺N is a ε-Nash equilibrium.
The proof of the Theorem requires some preliminary lemmas.
Recall the denotation C1 = Lf,me
Lf,xT . Moreover, put C2 = e
Lf,xT .
Lemma 2. For any external field µ ∈ M, and any control measure α ∈ U the
following estimate holds:
‖x(t, 0, x1, α, µ)− xˆ(t, 0, x2, α)‖ ≤ C2‖x1 − x2‖+ C1
∫ t
0
W (µˆ[τ ], µ[τ ])dτ
Proof. Denote x1(·) = x(·, 0, x1, α, µ), x2(·) = xˆ(·, 0, x2, α). We have that
‖x1(t)− x2(t)‖ ≤ ‖x1 − x2‖
+
∫
[0,t]×P
‖f(τ, x1(τ), µ[τ ], u)− f(τ, x2(τ), µˆ[τ ], u)‖α(d(τ, u))
≤ ‖x1 − x2‖+
∫ t
0
Lf,x‖x1(τ)− x2(τ)‖dτ +
∫ t
0
Lf,mW (µ[τ ], µˆ[τ ])dτ.
Using Gronwall inequality we get that
‖x1(t)− x2(t)‖ ≤
(
‖x1 − x2‖+ Lf,m
∫ t
0
W (µ[τ ], µˆ[τ ])dτ
)
eLf,xT (22)
Hence the conclusion of the Lemma follows.
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Lemma 3. There exists a constant C3 such that
W (µˆ[t], νˆN [t]) ≤ C3W (m0, δ
N
x
).
Proof. The definitions of measures χiN , and νˆN yield the inequality
W (νˆN [t], µˆ[t]) = sup
{∫
Rn
φ(x)νˆN [t](dx)−
∫
Rn
φ(x)µˆ[t](dx) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
=
{
N∑
i=1
∫
S[V,µˆ]
(φ(ξˆiN(t,Θ[x(·), z(·)]))− φ(x(t)))χ
i
N (d(x(·), z(·))) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
≤
N∑
i=1
∫
S[V,µˆ]
‖ξˆiN(t,Θ[x(·), z(·)])− x(t)‖χ
i
N (d(x(·), z(·))) (23)
For α = Θ[x(·), z(·)] and x∗ = x(0) we have that ξ
i
N(t, α) = x(t, 0, x
i
N,0, α, νˆN),
xˆ(t) = xˆ(t, 0, x∗, α). It follows from Lemma 2 that
‖ξˆiN(t,Θ[x(·), z(·)])− x(t)‖ ≤ C2‖x
i
N,0 − x∗‖+ C1
∫ t
0
W (νN [τ ], µˆ[τ ])dτ.
From this and estimate (23) we get the estimate
W (νˆN [t], µˆ[t]) ≤ C2
n∑
i=1
∫
G0
‖xiN,0 − x∗‖m
i
N(dx∗) + C1
∫ t
0
W (νN [τ ], µˆ[τ ])dτ.
By Lemma 1 we conclude that
W (νˆN [t], µˆ[t]) ≤ C2W (m0, δ
N
x
) + C1
∫ t
0
W (νN [τ ], µˆ[τ ])dτ.
From this and Gronwall’s inequality the conclusion of the Lemma follows with C3 =
C2 exp(C1T ).
Lemma 4. There exists a constant C4 such that for all ̺
j
N
W (ν˜N |j(t, ·; ̺
i
N), µˆ[t]) ≤ C3W (m0, δ
N
x
) +
C4
N
.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of the previous Lemma. As above, we
have that
W (ν˜N |j(t, ·; ̺
j
N), µˆ[t])
≤
∑
i 6=j
∫
S[V,µˆ]
‖ξ˜iN |j(t,Θ[x(·), z(·)]; ̺
j
N)− x(t)‖χ
i
N (d(x(·), z(·)))
+ sup
{∫
Rn
φ(x′)ν˜j
N |j(t, dx
′; ̺jN)−
∫
Rn
φ(x′′)µˆjN(t, dx
′′) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
. (24)
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Further,
sup
{∫
Rn
φ(x′)ν˜j
N |j(t, dx
′; ̺jN)−
∫
Rn
φ(x′′)µˆjN [t](dx) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
=
{∫
G×G
N(φ(x′)− φ(x′′))ν˜j
N |j(t, dx
′; ̺jN)µˆ
j
N(t, dx
′′) : φ ∈ Lip1
}
≤
diam(G)
N
.
Here we use the denotation
diam(G) = sup{‖x′ − x′′‖ : x′, x′′ ∈ G}.
From this, (24) and Lemma 2 we get the estimate
W (ν˜N |j(t, ·; ̺
j
N), µˆ[t]) ≤
diam(G)
N
+ C2W (m0, δ
N
x
) + C1
∫ t
0
W (ν˜N |j(τ, ·; ̺
j
N), µˆ[τ ])dτ.
Therefore, the Lemma is valid for C4 = diam(G) exp(C1T ).
Proof of Theorem 3. First we consider the case when all players use the strategies
determined by the profile ˆ̺N . Denote ρˆx = Θ#χ0,x. We have that ρˆx is a probabilistic
measure on U .
From Lemma 2 it follows that
‖xˆ(t, 0, x∗, α)− ξˆ
i
N(t, α)‖ ≤ C2‖x∗ − x
i
N,0‖+ C1tW(µˆ, νˆN).
From this and Lemma 3 we get the inequality
‖xˆ(t, 0, x∗, α)− ξˆ
i
N(t, α)‖ ≤ C2‖x∗ − x
i
N,0‖+ C1C3tW (m0, δ
N
x
). (25)
Denote C5 = C1C3T .
Moreover,
‖wˆ(T, 0, x∗, α)− ζˆ
i
N(T, α)‖
≤
∫ T
0
(Lg,x‖xˆ(t, 0, x∗, α)− ξˆ
i
N(t, α)‖+ Lg,mW (µˆ[t], νˆN [t]))dt
≤ Lg,xC2T‖x∗ − x
i
N,0‖+ T
2C1C3(Lg,x + Lg,m)W (m0, δ
N
x
). (26)
In addition, denote C6 = Lg,xC2T , C7 = T
2C1C3(Lg,x + Lg,m).
Therefore,∣∣∣∣J¯ jN(ˆ̺N)−N
∫
G0
mjN(dx∗)
∫
U
[σ(xˆ(T, 0, x∗, α), µˆ[T ]) + wˆ(T, 0, x∗, α)])ρˆx∗(α)
∣∣∣∣
= N
∫
G0
mjN(dx∗)
∫
U
|σ(ξˆiN(T, α), µˆ[T ]) + ζˆ(T, α)
− σ(xˆ(T, 0, x∗, α), µˆ[T ])− wˆ(T, 0, x∗, α)|ρˆx∗(α)
≤ N
∫
G0
((Lσ,xC2 + C6)‖x∗ − x
i
N,0‖+ (Lσ,xC5 + Lσ,mC3 + C7)W (m0, δ
N
x
))mjN (dx∗)
= (Lσ,xC2 + C6)N
∫
G0
‖x∗ − x
i
N,0‖m
i
N (dx∗) + (Lσ,xC5 + Lσ,mC3 + C7)W (m0, δ
N
x
)).
(27)
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Now consider the case when the player j deviates.
Since ˆ̺x∗ is concentrated on the set of optimal controls, we have that for a sample
player starting from (0, x∗), α ∈ supp(ρˆx∗) and all β ∈ U the following inequality
holds true:
σ(xˆ(T, 0, x∗, β), µˆ[T ]) + wˆ[T, 0, x∗, β] ≤ σ(xˆ(T, 0, x∗, α), µˆ[T ]) + wˆ(T, 0, x∗, α). (28)
Let for each x∗ ρx∗ be a probability measure on U . Integrating inequality (28) with
respect to ρˆx∗(dα), ρx∗(dβ), and m
j
N(dx∗), we get the inequality∫
G0
mjN (dx∗)
∫
U
(σ(xˆ(T, 0, x∗, β), µˆ[T ]) + zˆ(T, 0, x∗, β))ρx∗(dβ)
≤
∫
G0
mjN (dx∗)
∫
U
(σ(xˆ(T, 0, x∗, α), µˆ[T ]) + zˆ(T, 0, x∗, α))ρˆx∗(dα). (29)
Now, from Lemma 2 we have that
‖xˆ(t, 0, x∗, β)− ξ˜
j
N |j(t, β; ̺
j
N)‖ ≤ C2‖x∗ − x
i
N,0‖+ C1tW(µˆ, ν˜N |j(·, ·; ̺
j
N)).
Further, it follows from Lemma 4 that
‖xˆ(t, 0, x∗, β)− ξ˜
j
N |j(t, β; ̺
j
N)‖ ≤ C2‖x∗ − x
i
N,0‖+ C1tC3W (m0, δ
N
x
) +
C1C4t
N
. (30)
As above we have that
‖wˆ(T, 0, x∗, β)− ζ˜
j
N |j(T, β; ̺
j
N)‖
≤
∫ T
0
(Lg,x‖xˆ(t, 0, x∗, β)− ξ˜
i
N(t, β; ̺
j
N)‖+ Lg,mW (µˆ[t], ν˜N |j(t, ·; ̺
j
N)))dt
≤ C6‖x∗ − x
j
N,0‖+ C7W (m0, δ
N
x
) + (Lg,mC4T + C1C4T
2Lg,x)
1
N
. (31)
Denote C8 = Lg,mC4T + C1C4T
2Lg,x.
Hence, we have the estimate
|σ(xˆ(T, 0, x∗, β), µˆ[T ])+ wˆ(T, 0, x∗, β)−σ(ξ˜
j
N(T, β; ̺
j
N), ν˜N(T, ·; ̺
j
N))− ζ˜
j
N(T, β; ̺
j
N)|
≤ (Lσ,xC2 + C6)‖x∗ − x
j
N,0‖+ (Lσ,xC5 + Lσ,mC3 + C7)W (m0, δ
N
x
)
+ (Lσ,xC1C4T + Lσ,mC4 + C8)
1
N
(32)
It follows from [4, Theorem 10.4.6] that for any measure ̺jN ∈ P(U) there exists
a system of measures ρx∗ ∈ P(U) such that for any function ϕ ∈ C(U)∫
U
ϕ(β)̺jN(β) = N
∫
G0
mjN(dx∗)
∫
U
ϕ(β)ρx∗(dβ).
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From this (29), (32) and substitution of the value of J¯ jN(ˆ̺N |̺
j
N), we get the estimate∣∣∣∣J¯ jN(ˆ̺N |̺jN )−N
∫
G0
mjN (dx∗)
∫
U
(σ(xˆ(T, 0, x∗, β), µˆ[T ]) + wˆ(T, 0, x∗, β))ρx∗(dβ)
∣∣∣∣
≤ (Lσ,xC2 + C6)N
∫
G0
‖x∗ − x
j
N,0‖m
j
N(dx∗) + (Lσ,xC5 + Lσ,mC3 + C7)W (m0, δ
N
x
)
+ (Lσ,xC1C4T + Lσ,mC4 + C8)
1
N
This, (27), and (29) yield that
J¯ jN(ˆ̺N) ≥ J¯
j
N(ˆ̺N |̺
j
N)− 2(Lσ,xC2 + C6)N
∫
G0
‖x∗ − x
j
N,0‖m
j
N(dx∗)
− 2(Lσ,xC5 + Lσ,mC3 + C7)W (m0, δ
N
x
)− (Lσ,xC1C4T + Lσ,mC4 + C8)
1
N
.
This inequality is the conclusion of the Theorem for Cˆ1 = 2C8, Cˆ2 = 2(Lσ,xC2 + C6)
and Cˆ3 = C9.
References
[1] Aubin J.-P. Viability theory. Birkhau¨ser, Basel. 1992.
[2] Aumann R.J. Markets with a continuum of traders. Econometrica 32 (1964),
39–50.
[3] Aumann R.J. Existence of competitive equilibrium in markets with continuum
of traders. Econometrica. 34 (1966), 1–17.
[4] Bogachev V.I. Measure theory. V. 1,2. Springer, Berlin. 2007.
[5] Bagagiolo F., Bauso D. Mean-field games and dynamic demand management in
power grids. Dynamic Games and Applications (to appear).
[6] Cardaliaguet P. Weak solutions for first order mean field games with local cou-
pling, 2013, arXiv:1305.7015.
[7] Cardaliaguet P. Notes on mean eld games. P.-L. Lions lectures, Colle`ge de France.
2012. https://www.ceremade.dauphine.fr/∼cardalia/MFG100629.pdf
[8] Cˇencov A.G. On a game problem of convering at a given instant of time. Math-
ematics of the USSR-Sbornik, 28:3 (1976). 353–376.
[9] D. A. Gomes, J. Sau´de. Mean Field Games ModelsA Brief Survey. Dynamic
Games and Applications (in print).
[10] Gomes D., Voskanyan V. Extended mean-field gamesformulation, existence,
uniqueness and examples, 2013, arXiv:1305.2600.
25
[11] Gue´ant O., Lasry J.-M., Lions P.-L. Mean field games and applications. Paris-
Princeton Lectures on Mathematical Finance 2010, Springer.
[12] Huang M., Caines P.E., Malhame´ R.P. Individual and mass behaviour in large
population stochastic wireless power control problems: centralized and Nash
equilibrium solutions. Proc. the 42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,
Maui, Hawaii, 98-103, December 2003.
[13] Huang M., Malhame´ R.P., Caines P.E. Nash equilibria for large population lin-
ear stochastic systems with weakly coupled agents. In: E.K. Boukas, R. P. Mal-
hame (Eds). Analysis, Control and Optimization of Complex Dynamic Systems.
Springer (2005). 215-252.
[14] Huang M., Malhame´ R.P., Caines P.E. Large population stochastic dynamic
games: closed–loop Mckean-Vlasov systems and the Nash certainty equivalence
principle. Communications in information and systems, 6 (2006), 221-252.
[15] Huang M., Caines P. E., Malhame´ R.P. Large-population cost- coupled LQG
problems with nonuniform agents: Individual-mass behavior and decentralized
ε-Nash equilibria . IEEE Trans. Automat. Contol, 52:9, (2007), 1560-1571.
[16] Huang M., Caines P. E., Malhame´ R.P. The NCE (mean field) principle with lo-
cality dependent cost interactions. IEEE Trans. Automat. Control, 55:12 (2010),
2799–2805.
[17] Khan M.A., Sun Y. Non-cooperative games with many players. In. Aumann
R.J., Hart S. (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. 3.
North-Holland, Amsterdam. 1761–1808. 2002.
[18] Krasovskii N.N., Subbotin A.I. Game-theoretical control problems. Springer,
New York. 1988.
[19] Kolokoltsov V. N., Li J. J., Yang W. Mean field games and nonlinear markov
processes, 2011. arXiv:1112.3744v2
[20] Kolokoltsov V.N., Yang W. Sensitivity analysis for HJB equations with an ap-
plication to a coupled backward-forward system. 2013. arXiv:1303.6234.
[21] Lasry J.-M., Lions P.-L. Jeux champ moyen. I. Le cas stationnaire. (French)
[Mean field games. I. The stationary case] C. R. Math. Acad. Sci. Paris, 343:9
(2006), 619-625.
[22] Lasry J.-M., Lions P.-L. Jeux champ moyen. II. Horizon fini et contrle optimal.
(French) [Mean field games. II. Finite horizon and optimal control] C. R. Math.
Acad. Sci. Paris, 343:10 (2006), 679-684.
[23] Lasry J.-M., Lions P.-L. Mean field games. Japanese Journal of Mathematics,
2:1 (2007), 229-260.
26
[24] Lions P.-L. The´orie des jeux a` champs moyen et applications. Cours au Colle´ge
de France, www.college-de-france.fr.
[25] Petrosjan L. A., Ulanov V. A. Dynamic games with an infinite number of players.
Basic constructions. Vestnik Leningrad. Univ. Mat. Mekh. Astronom. 2 (1982),
69-75 (in Russian).
[26] Subbotin A.I., Chentsov A.G. Optimization of guarantee in control problems.
Nauka, Moscow. 1981 (in Russian).
[27] Subbotin A.I.: Generalized solutions of first-order PDEs. The dynamical per-
spective. Birkhau¨ser, Boston. 1995.
[28] Villani C. Optimal transport: old and new, Springer, Berlin, 2009.
[29] Vind K. Edgeworth-allocations is an exchange economy with many traders. In-
ternational Economical Review. 5 (1964). 165–177.
[30] Warga J. Optimal control of differential and functional equations. Academic
press, New York. 1972
27
